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ABSTRACT
Utilising an analytical framework informed by a moral economy approach, this arti-
cle examines the social relationships between bank workers and customers in the
context of changing performance management. Informed by 46 in-depth interviews
with branch workers and branch managers from UK banks, this article focusses on
the interplay of the pressures arising from an intensiﬁed and all-encompassing perfor-
mance management system and bank workers lay morality. The article seeks to
analyse why one group of bank workers engages with customers in a primarily instru-
mental manner, while another group tends to mediate and engage in oppositional
practices which aim to avoid such an instrumentalisation. The article argues that
moral economy gives voice to the agency of workers and the critical concerns of the
social, economic and moral consequences of market-driven and purely proﬁt-oriented
workplace regimes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Informed by 46 in-depth interviews with bank workers and branch managers (BMs)
from different UK retail bank branches and framed by the analytical framework of
moral economy (ME), this article sheds light on two key aspects: ﬁrst, the article
explores how the labour process in retail banks changed in the last two decades,
dominated by intensiﬁed performance management system (PMS) that features an
all-encompassing managerial control system that pushes bank workers to relate in-
strumentally to customers and prioritise selling over customer orientation. Second,
the article explores why a group of recently recruited bank workers are more prone
to instrumentalise customers, while a group of more experienced bank workers are
more likely to avoid such instrumentalisation by engaging in oppositional practices.
This article utilises an ME approach to work and employment that frames the explo-
ration of workers experiences of intensiﬁed PM in front-line-service work (FLSW),
analysing the materialist reality of the labour process as well as workers lay morality
which shapes if and how they engage in oppositional practices to compliance, respec-
tively. The framework of ME focusses on how economic practices are shaped by
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moral norms and sentiments, and how, in turn, moral norms and sentiments are
formed by economic and institutional forces. Part and parcel of an ME approach
to work and employment is the concept of lay morality that theorises actors as eval-
uative and sentient beings, whose evaluation of their own and others’ actions and
faring is informed by notions of justice and fairness, informing actions that range
from oppositional practices to compliance.
2 THE PREVALENCE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
A common theme within the sociology of work and employment is the observation of
‘(…) the greater use of market forces in organising the employment relationship’
(McGovern et al., 2007: 41). A testimonial of this is the development and centrality
of PMS in organisations (Cushen, 2013; Findlay and Thompson, 2017). Performance
management has evolved in the last two decades in many sectors of the economy
from annual performance appraisal practices towards a systematic and ongoing
managerial control system (Laaser, 2016; Taylor, 2013; Williams and Beck, 2018).
While PMS expresses continuity with, and indeed combine, traditional managerial
control techniques, critical employment and management scholarship point towards
the greater scope for managerial control that PMS enables featuring methodical
collection, storage, analysis and display of information of workers’ effort via the
utilisation of sophisticated Information and Communications Technology (Carter et
al., 2014; Jeske and Santuzzi, 2015; Laaser, 2013; Laaser and Bolton, 2017; Newsome
et al., 2013).
Performance management system (PMS) has become particularly prevalent in
semi-routinised FLSW were front-line workers are ‘in direct contact with customers
(…) and in a subordinate position in the employment relationship’ (Bélanger and Ed-
wards, 2013: 436). Critical employment research indicates that PMS in semi-
routinised FLSW feature individualised performance targets, systematic collection,
analysis and evaluation of work effort, performance-related pay and punitive mana-
gerial practices (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Ellis and Taylor, 2006; Korczynski
and Ott, 2005). A prime example of an industry in which PMS became a dominating
feature is the banking sector in the UK. Historically, the banking industry was
characterised by paternalist management practices that fostered a unitary ideology
with the propagation of shared objectives and values that masked the power asymme-
try between BMs and workers (Heritage, 1977; Kerfoot and Knights, 1993). Further-
more, patriarchal values were deeply ingrained in the organisation of work, encoded
in high levels of sexual division of labour and overt and covert discrimination
against female bank worker (Crompton, 1989). In tandem with paternalism and
patriarchism, banks workplace regime rested on early forms of appraisal systems that
assessed behavioural and social dimensions of bank staff via highly subjective annual
inspections, aiming to bend staff to the unique banking culture (McKinlay, 2002).
The development of PMS in the banking industry is intermeshed with the wider
changes in the political economy. The ﬁnancial industry witnessed seismic shifts in
the 1980s under the Thatcher regime, being subject to deregulation and re-regulation
policies that aimed to increase the proﬁtability and market power of the industry
via heightened entrepreneurialism and competition between ﬁnancial organisations
(Kerfoot and Knights, 1993; Knights and McCabe, 1998; Watson, 2004). Banks
responded in the late 1980s to the changing political economy of the ﬁnancial industry
by implementing harsher forms of strategic management programmes that informed
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ongoing organisational restructuring, encoded in the outsourcing of back ofﬁce work,
reduction of branches and investment in tele and online banking (Morgan and Sturdy,
2000). Meanwhile, total quality management programmes introduced a performance
culture that focussed on ‘bottom line productivity’ (Knights and McCabe, 1999:
205). A signiﬁcant feature of this development was the introduction of performance
management in the form of targets for service quality, sales-based income generation
and cost control (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). In the early 90s performance targets were
ﬁltered down to bank workers and became an integral part of the annual appraisal
mechanism. In this environment, paternalist management practices coexisted with
early forms of PMS but lost essentially its central role when ‘responsibility and ac-
countability (…) shifted down the lower hierarchy (…) [with the] effect of individualiz-
ing staff’ (Kerfoot andKnights, 1993: 671). However, case study research suggests that
performance targets were cautiously adopted by UK banks to that time. Although
modest proﬁt-related pay and bonuses for meeting particular targets were selectively
implemented in the labour process, strict enforcement of performance targets in tan-
dem with individualised rewards and disciplinary mechanisms were overall regarded
by branch and regional management to be in conﬂict with teamwork and customer
orientation (Hardie and Maxﬁeld, 2013; Morgan and Sturdy, 2000; Storey, 1995).
Ample evidence suggests that the role of PMS became central to the labour
process in banks throughout the 2000s, featuring a wider range of behavioural and
sales-related targets in combination with disciplinary policies that implement market
discipline in the ﬁrm (Ellis and Taylor, 2010; Laaser, 2016; Taylor, 2013). The harsher
and more punitive nature of PMS emerged against the backdrop of intensiﬁed
competition in the ﬁnancial industry between national and international banks and
the proliferation of industry wide merger and acquisition activities and raising share-
holder expectations (Gall, 2017). Research on the causes and consequences of the
ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted that the way PMS shape the organisation of work
and employment practices in banks incentivises bank workers to engage in the mis-
selling of ﬁnancial products (Ellis and Taylor, 2010; Froud et al., 2016). Despite the
implementation of compliance departments in banks in the post-ﬁnancial crisis era
that are internally and externally promoted as an instrument that heightens and
monitors ethical sales practice, mis-selling remains prevalent (Brannan, 2017; Laaser,
2016; McCabe, 2016).
Thus far, research focusses primarily on the motives of individual employees for
mis-selling, while insights that bring together an analysis of the pressures of the
PMS-driven workplace regimes and how and why employees consent, mediate or re-
sist remain scant (Brannan, 2017). In this light, calls for research have been issued to
explore the social, economic and moral dimensions of sales-driven service work
(Bolton and Houlihan, 2005; Darr, 2011; Korczynski, 2009). This article addresses
the call for research and contribute to an understanding of how bank workers lay
morality plays an important role for understanding a key driving force behind oppo-
sitional practices as well as consent.
3 APPROACHING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRONT-LINE-
SERVICE WORKERS AND CUSTOMERS
Sociological informed literature about service work highlights that relationships
with customers can be a fundamental source of satisfaction and meaning for FLSWs
when it is socially embedded, enabling workers to relate to customers as economic,
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social and moral actors (Bolton and Houlihan, 2005; Korczynski, 2009). Likewise,
the relationship between both groups can also be a source of suffering for FLWs when
the encounter is stripped of its social context and exclusively informed by instrumen-
tal values (Fevre, 2003; McCabe, 2016). Consequently, it is argued that FLWs expe-
rience customers as a source of meaning and pain simultaneously due to the tension
between quality service and quantiﬁed work effort targets that is understood to be
an integral part of contemporary service work (Korczynski, 2009).
Critical service work literature on semi-routinised service work with a strong focus
on sales work offers contrasting interpretations regarding the impact target-driven
management practices have on the relationship between FLWs and customers. One
group of scholars suggest that the combination of individualised performance
targets with performance-related pay and low levels of job security results in instru-
mental and objectiﬁed engagements of FLWs with bank workers. Here, sales workers
are seen to display an ‘unprecedented attitude of derision and contempt’ vis-à-vis
customers (Bone, 2006: 2), informed by disembodied concepts of customers as
‘numbers’ (McCabe, 2016) and ‘instruments of the sales process’ (Oakes, 1990: 37).
In particular, case studies reveal that the instrumentalisation of customers is
encoded in practices such as the allocation of time slots to customers based on their
ﬁnancial resources (Honneger et al., 2010), the manipulation of product information
(Korczynski and Ott, 2005) and the systematic mis-selling of products (Brannan,
2017). While providing important insights into the interplay between the organisation
of work and the social relations between customers and FLWs, these accounts delin-
eate that workers tend to comply to and, in some cases, internalise the pressure to ob-
jectify customers. This line of reasoning shares similarities with the much-discussed
sociological thesis of demoralisation under modern capitalism (Fevre, 2003). For
example, Richard Sennett (1998) concludes that thanks to the implementation of un-
fettered market logics in organisations at the end of the 20th century, economic ratio-
nality values have undermined opportunities for employees to develop a workplace
community that is framed by workers’ own moral values. Similarly, Catherine Casey
(1995: 124) submits that the prevailing economic rationality values are a powerful
construct to ‘goad employees into hard work, devotion and productive service’, while
undermining employees ability to develop their own sense of justice or injustice.
A less deterministic outlook is advocated by a group of employment relations re-
searcher that takes an institutional theory approach. Korczynski and Ott (2005) ex-
plore different set of relationships between bank workers and customers in two
Australian banks, ranging from instrumental and objectiﬁed forms of engagements
to ones that feature trust and respect. The authors argue that these divergent set of
relations can be explained with the embeddedness of actors in low-trust or high-trust
networks in the context of particular market segments that foster either arm’s
length or trusting relationships (see also, for similar approaches, Regini et al.,
1999). Accordingly, social relations between employees and customers are explained
with recourse to structuring factors, particularly market and employment conditions,
which are seen to determine the quality of the relationship between FLWs and cus-
tomers. The demoralisation thesis, and to some extent also the employment relations
perspective, is frequently criticised by researchers from the labour process theory
camp for neglecting labour agency and informal self-organisation that is informed
by workers ‘own metrics of comparison’ (Edwards, 2015: 287; also, Ackroyd,
2012). Labour process informed research that explores the tension between quantita-
tive and qualitative targets on the one hand, and their implications for the social
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relationships between FLWs and customers suggest that FLWs frequently manipu-
late and work-around performance target restrictions in order to regain discretion
at work and provide a service that they perceive as fair and appropriate (Bolton
and Houlihan, 2005; Callaghan and Thompson, 2001). Taking this argumentation
further, Darr (2011: 508) illustrates that social relations between sales workers and
customers in a store that sells electronic equipment are shaped by competing eco-
nomic, social and moral values that ‘co-exist on the sales ﬂoor, each impacting on
the trajectories and outcomes of sales-encounters’. This body of work provides an
important account of FLWs’ moral values of fairness and justice that frame relation-
ships with customers. However, workers’ moral notions of justice and fairness appear
relatively homogenous in this research, while the relationship between particular
workplace regimes and workers’ moral notions remains unclear.
The article aims to contribute to this literature by exploring why under an intensi-
ﬁed disciplinarian PMS workplace regime one group of bank worker tends to resist an
objectiﬁcation of customers while another group of bank workers tends to relate to
customers in a primarily instrumental manner. The ME approach to work and em-
ployment will be introduced in the next section.
4 MORAL ECONOMY OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT: BRINGING
WORKERS LAY NOTIONS OF JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN
The concept of ME became popularised by Thompson’s (1991) work on the ME in
pre-industrial societies. The economic historian suggests that communities of people
were tied together by a shared set of moral values, customs and mentalities that
represented a wider consensus regarding the means and ends of economic practices.
Thompson illustrates that peoples’ resistance under the spread of laissez-fair capital-
ism to speciﬁc events, such as the rise of bread prices in times of scarcity, was
informed by shared values and mentalities concerning entitlements to livelihood, re-
sponsibilities and just economic practices that were ‘rooted in both the community
and the past’ (Mau, 2005: 466). However, Thompson situates the ME he describes
in the pre-industrial capitalist stage, suggesting that a bottom-up ME will eventually
be eliminated by ubiquitous values and norms of the market-driven society. Contem-
porary ME approaches continue to take Thompson as a starting point for formulat-
ing a revised ME concept. Here, the focus is on the relationship between the demands
of capitalist markets, the norm-generating capacity of institutions and peoples’ values
of justice and fairness (Koos and Sachweh, 2017; Mau, 2005). Here, it is suggested
that institutional arrangements shape peoples’ moral notions to a signiﬁcant degree
through the way responsibilities, duties and rights are deﬁned and allocated (Banks,
2006). Yet institutions are not understood to produce an ME and dictate values of
justice and fairness. Instead, conﬂicts are likely to occur when institutions violate
widely shared moral values and norms of people that exist independently. Neverthe-
less, it is argued that conﬂict is likely to trigger a (re-)negotiation process between
relevant groups of people and institutions, fostering a temporary consensus that rests
on a moral and cognitive legitimacy of how things are (Koos and Sachweh, 2017).
Andrew Sayer adds to this approach a more actor centred understanding, while
taking the power of institutions for shaping peoples’ notions of justice and fairness
serious. Sayer conceptualises actors as vulnerable, sentient and dependent beings
who develop through being immersed in institutions, practices and social relation-
ships a, however, potentially fallible, understanding of how certain practices and
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relationships impact well-being (Sayer, 2011). This is captured in the concept of
lay morality that refers to people’s ongoing monitoring and evaluation of their
own and others’ actions and faring in the context of their complex needs and under-
standings of what practices constitute well-being or, respectively, trigger suffering
(Sayer, 2005).
Against this backdrop, Sayer’s ME thesis highlights that a fundamental tension
exists between capitalist organisations that aim to purify their practices for proﬁt
maximisation and employees’ wider needs for human connection. Sayer puts the
spotlight on how human needs, concerns and moral sentiments tend to spill over
the instrumental frame of the employment relationship, which is visible in re-
sponses and social relationships that ‘may vary considerably in how far they con-
form to the organisation’s priorities’ (Sayer, 2006: 206). This ME concept diverges
from more institution centric ME approaches and shares similarities with labour
process analysis in the way that consent is not understood to be inevitably
established over time and that dissent can be a stable feature within organisations
that is fed by workers lay morality (Bolton and Laaser, 2013; Laaser, 2016). In this
way, workers are understood to be capable to evaluate organisational demands
and practices critically and may formally and informally resist or mediate
organisational expectations and demands when they experience them to be in con-
ﬂict with their lay morality. Yet the shape and form of peoples’ lay morality at
work might differ between different groups of workers, depending on the structures
and relationships they have been embedded in over time.
In line with Edward’s (2015) call for sociological engagements with normative argu-
ments, this ME approach combines a dual focus on structure and agency. Here, the
spotlight is on the demands of capitalist markets, the norm-generating capacity of insti-
tutions and peoples’ lay morality that they form as relational and sentient actors. Such
a theoretical framework is valuable for exploring how bank workers experience PMS
and react to its demand to prioritise selling over relational engagements with customers
in different ways against the backdrop of changing workplace regimes.
5 RESEARCH METHOD
The article draws on data from a wider research project conducted between 2012 and
2013 and between 2016 and 2017 in the banking industry that aimed to capture bank
workers (BWs) and branch managers (BMs) experience of the radically changing
workplace regime in UK banks over the last three decades. Overall, 46 interviews
were conducted with BWs and BMs, lasting between one and three hours and culmi-
nated in 89 hours of interview material. The method of sampling was purposeful. The
main criteria were that BWs and BMs had to possess at least 10 years of work expe-
rience and had to be employed in one of the leading retail/clearing banks in the UK.
This criteria ensured that interviewees possessed signiﬁcant work experience while
also being able to reﬂect, to different degrees, on the implementation and implication
of PMS and its impact on their engagements with customers. The sample was based
on self-selection and snowball sampling after a research description, and invitation
had been sent through relevant professional networks. The 46 participants are or have
been employed in one of the ﬁve biggest clearing and retail banks in the UK. Out of
the 46 interviewees, 39 were employed in a range of non-managerial positions, while
seven interviewees hold a managerial position in a bank. Based on this sample, three
distinctive groups of bank employees and managers can be differentiated. One group
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consists of 17 interviewees who entered the banking industry in the late 1970s and
throughout the early 1980s; 12 individuals were interviewed who started their employ-
ment in the banking industry between the mid-1980s and early 90s. The ﬁnal group of
interviewees consists of 17 individuals who worked for a bank from the mid-90s and
early 2000s onward.
All ﬁve banks are leading national banks in the UK who dominated the ﬁnan-
cial market for large parts of the 20th century and continue to belong to the group
of the most proﬁtable clearing banks after the liberalisation of the ﬁnancial indus-
try and its ﬁnancial crisis. Their strategic focus and operations are similar, focus-
sing on corporate and private banking, covering a wide range of ﬁnancial
services, ranging from savings to investments. Interviewees are almost equally
spread across the ﬁve banks, with nine interviewees working for Banks A and B,
respectively; 12 interviewees for Bank C; and 10 interviewees for Bank D. The re-
maining six interviewees were employed at Bank E. Even though differences in re-
gard to corporate strategies, market share, total number of employees and
branches exist between the leading national banks, research suggests that the bank-
ing industry is and has been traditionally homogenous when it comes to the orga-
nisation of work and management practices in branches (Watson, 2004).
All interviews were with consent digitally recorded and transcribed. To guarantee
anonymity, biographical and organisational details and names of all interviewees
have been changed. Interviews with BWs and BMs were semi-structured and open
ended, featuring the following research themes: the changing nature of employment
relationships in banks in the last three decades; if and how the changing conditions
impacted on horizontal and vertical social relations; and if and how the changing
conditions impacted on relations with customers. The analysis of the empirical mate-
rial rests on thematic coding to identify recurring themes in the narratives, from which
a categorisation of themes in ‘ﬁrst-order’ and ‘higher-order’ codes emerged. Based on
this process, higher-order codes were created to group and label emerging themes of
respondents’ narratives (e.g. ‘role of lay morality’, ‘nature of relationships between
BWs and customers’, and ‘BWs’ responses to PMS’) that were as part of the data
analysis grouped into lower-order codes (e.g. the higher-order code of ‘BWs’ re-
sponses’ was grouped into ‘compliance’, ‘mediation and ‘resistance’, while the
higher-order code of ‘lay morality’ was divided into particular moral values). The
lower-order codes then informed second-order codes that drew on the different re-
sponses of the two groups of BWs.
Narratives about the past, particularly when they include aspects of social
change, risk being clouded by a sentimental attachment of interviewees to the past
(Strangleman, 1999). However, the narratives in this research about the past are
relatively reﬂective when it comes to the upside and downside of the labour process
and while a bias of interviewees towards overstating the positive of the past labour
process cannot be ruled out, it presents an important source in combination with
research on that era for understanding how PMS has changed and impacted on
relations with customers.
6 FINDINGS
The ﬁndings are structured in three sections. The ﬁrst section focusses on contempo-
rary PMS in bank branches. The second section illustrates how BWs, who joined the
occupation before or in the early 1990s, developed a lay morality within a workplace
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regime that rested on an early form of PMS. This lay morality, it is argued, continues
to serve as a reference point for oppositional practices and customer-oriented rela-
tions under the contemporary PMS. The third section discusses how BWs, who joined
the occupation under the contemporary PMS, lack a lay morality that fosters an un-
derstanding of customers as social and economic actors, resulting in compliance to
the demands of PMS.
7 CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN UK
RETAIL BANKS
Against the backdrop of an increasingly competitive ﬁnancial industry in which the
supply of ﬁnancial products exceeds signiﬁcantly the demand, all-encompassing
PMS became dominant in bank branches in the 2000s. This signiﬁes the transfor-
mation from early PMS that combined annual appraisal methods, qualitative be-
havioural targets with forms of paternalist management practices to coercive
forms of management control to ensure proﬁtability and workers compliance in
an increasingly standardised labour process (Kerfoot and Knights, 1993; Knights
and McCabe, 1999; Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). Indeed, from the 2000s onwards,
the work of each individual branch member was structured, closely monitored,
measured and recorded by sophisticated Information and Communications Tech-
nologies, including the number, nature, content and length of customer interaction
(McCabe, 2016; Taylor, 2013). In the light of intensiﬁed micromanagement and
harsher disciplinary practices, bank workers were subject to individualised quanti-
tative and qualitative performance targets. Quantitative performance targets em-
bodied concrete, time bound and individual work effort expectations. The vast
majority of quantitative targets were explicit sales targets for ﬁnancial products,
while qualitative targets reﬂect primarily behavioural descriptors. Interviewees indi-
cate that quantitative targets were key for performance evaluations, whereas qual-
itative targets were considered as less relevant.
It is all about selling as much as possible. But it is also about what to sell. It is good to recruit new cus-
tomers and open bank accounts, but it is more proﬁtable for the bank if we sell insurances, mortgages,
more complex retirement packages and so on. And that is reﬂected in the performance targets that focus
exactly on that. Interviewees indicate that quantitative targets are
Narratives illustrate that work performance data was entered into an individualised
balance scorecard, or a similar matrix, which aligns the respective work effort with
quantitative and qualitative performance targets. A signiﬁcant part of this process
was the automatised evaluation of work effort, evident in the allocation of points
(Banks A and D) or percentages (Banks B and C) to workers, indicating how well
the individual has performed over a certain time period. Competitiveness and condi-
tionality were heightened in the branch through the existence of explicit disciplinary
policies that range from formal warnings to forced exit in case employees are repeat-
edly not meeting their targets. Meanwhile, giveaways or modest bonus payments,
ranging from 200 to 1200 pounds a year, rewarded branch workers who met their tar-
gets. In this way, job security was directly linked to BWs’ performance, fostering an
individualisation of risk and rewards.
Everything we do feeds into the scorecard that gives us points for performance and results in a total
score (…) This total score then decides whether you are eligible for a bonus or if you are subject to dis-
ciplinary policies. (Mick, Senior Customer Relationship Advisor, Bank A, employed since 1984)
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8 ‘CUSTOMERS WERE NOT OBJECTS TO SUCK BLOOD FROM’: LAY
MORALITY AND OPPOSITIONAL PRACTICES
Against the backdrop of themove towards strategic management practices and the ﬁrst
wave of performance targets that were implemented in bank branches in the early
1990s, covering mostly service quality dimensions and technical aspects of the job, in-
terviewees who worked in a branch to that time describe their work to have revolved
around administrative processes and the establishing and nurturing of long-term rela-
tionships with individual customers. Narratives of this group amplify that while the
marketing of products became a pivotal aspect of their work when performance targets
for service quality were introduced, branch workers were not subject to constant scor-
ing and evaluation nor were disciplinary policies coupled with sales performance. In
this environment, the relationship with customers spilled over the instrumental frame
of economic encounters and entailed a valuation of the customer as a social, economic
and moral person:
There was that understanding amongst us that we were there to get to know our customers and support
them. It was an on-going relationship, lasting over many years, sometimes over decades. Of course we were
marketing products to customers as well but we were not throwing products at them. Quite often meetings
with customers had nothing to do with pitching ﬁnancial products. It was more about having a chat and
getting to know the person and what they have been up to. (Tom, Clerk, Bank D, employed since 1985)
This group of BWs developed lay understandings of justice and fairness in respect to
the nature of their engagements with customers, which they experienced as an intelli-
gible moral order that they attached to, cared about and reproduced as a community
(Thompson, 1991). Notions of fairness and justice are encoded in Jeff’s and Tom’s
experience of customers as vulnerable actors, informing a careful attentiveness to
the needs and anticipated vulnerabilities of customers as well as how customers’ social
and economic well-being was affected by their work (Sayer, 2005).
Customers were not objects to suck blood from. They were Mr. Smith andMs. MacIntyre and we aimed
to serve them well. We knew that the wrong ﬁnancial product could impact on customers’ life tremen-
dously. (Jeff, Customer Consultant, Bank A, employed since 1981)
Customers trusted us and there was a sense of responsibility that we developed for them. (Paul, Senior
Clerk, Bank C, employed since 1987)
While the labour process in the early 1990s featured pockets of job discretion for
branch workers, it was intermeshed in paternalist management practices and
patriarchism that were experienced as discriminating and belittling bank workers.
Susan’s account is one of several reﬂections which provide context to the labour pro-
cess in the 1990s, pointing towards high levels of sexual division of labour and overt
and covert discrimination against female bank workers.
We faced a lot of inequality: we didn’t get paid the same money, we were almost never promoted (…) we
were basically stuck in the bank teller position or back ofﬁce. (Susan, Teller, Banks A, B and C,
employed since 1972, retired in 2003)
We were not allowed to take the same external training schemes as our male colleagues, even though
taking them was a requirement for getting promoted. Management said that there is not enough money
for all of us to take the exams, but in the end only the male staff went. (Paula, Bank A, employed since
1981, retired in 2010)
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Narratives of this group indicate that they experienced the intensiﬁcation of the PMS
in general and the implementation of sales targets in particular that demanded an
instrumentalisation of customers as a severe indignation of their tacit moral values of
fairness and justice that underpinned their work (Koss and Sachweh, 2017). However,
the majority of this group critically evaluates the nature and concrete demands of the
target-driven workplace regime through the lay morality they developed in the more
customer-oriented workplace regime throughout the early 1990s. Narratives showcase
how perceptions of fairness and justice continued to inform practices at work that
resisted and mediated the concrete demands posed by the PMS. At the core of Marie’s
account is an understanding of bank work as relational work, intermeshed in careful
attentiveness to customers. Further, her lay morality informed a punctual resistance
at work, embodied in her decision to disregard the marketing of speciﬁc ﬁnancial
products.
Bank work nowadays is all about selling as much as possible, completely ignoring that we are respon-
sible for our customers (…) If I am not convinced that the product beneﬁts the customer, I will not pur-
sue it further. There are products I am not selling because I know they are rubbish. In practice this
means that I need to meet more customers and stay a bit longer in the branch once a week (…) It is
not always easy to meet the targets that way, but I am an old fashioned bank worker and I do things
the right way. (Marie, Customer Advisor, Bank B, employed since 1988)
In a similar vein, Nate developed a set of questions that guided his engagements with
customers and are informed by strong notions of justice and fairness that aimed to
juxtapose the pressure to instrumentalise customers via lay moral values. This is in-
herent in the perception of customers as embodied actors whose ﬁnancial well-being,
and arguably ‘livelihood’, is understood to be interlinked with a careful consultation
and selection of appropriate ﬁnancial products. In this light, Nate’s account points
towards two complimentary actions that are informed by his lay morality: His lay
morality triggered oppositional practices vis-à-vis demands of the PMS that pushes
for an unbuffered proﬁt orientation that fails to take the dependency and needs of
customers as economic and social actors into account. Furthermore, his lay morality
informed an intelligible reinterpretation of bank work that sets moral and economic
boundaries to the contemporary PMS, attempting to harmonise bank work with
the mentality that emerged in the shared experiences of the labour process from the
past (Thompson, 1991).
The opportunities to develop relationships with customers are limited, but there is a human being sitting
in front of me. At the same time I have to sell to secure my job (…) When I meet customers, I ask myself:
Will they beneﬁt from the product and do I know the product well enough? In the case of credit or mort-
gage lending: Are they able to pay it back? I have decided not to sell when I cannot answer these ques-
tions with a yes, even though the computer system gives green light to almost everything. The wrong
product can jeopardize customers’ ﬁnancial situation. (Nate, Customer Advisor, Bank C, employed
since 1982)
The various accounts of this group delineate how BWs aimed to balance the social,
moral and economic sphere of customer engagements, searching for ways to channel
pressures to instrumentalise relationships, juxtaposing sales targets with their percep-
tion of customers as social and economic actors. While BWs suggest that the relation-
ships they had with customers could not be sustained in the new environment that
systematically deracinates it from its social and moral underpinning, narratives imply
that they searched for ways to re-humanise and re-moralise engagements with
10 Knut Laaser
© 2019 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
customers. This is evident in Karen’s account which describes her resistance to the
technologies that framed the instrumentalisation of customer.
When I am meeting customers I am avoiding using the computer and standardized programs when
meeting customers. Instead, I am using pen and paper. I will enter relevant information after the meet-
ing. This allows me to engage with customers in a more personal way and use my own judgement (…)
Just like we did in the old days. (Karen, Customer Advisor, Bank E, employed since 1987)
It can be argued that BWs lay morality informed practices that are oppositional and
consensual, as work effort expectations were met and proﬁt for the organisation was
created. Yet interviewees provide ample evidence that their actions challenge the raw
edges of the PMS regime and are experienced by BMs as resisting acts, causing open
conﬂicts between both groups.
I have been in a bank for a long time now and I am able to make judgment for myself: Just because I can
offer an 80 year old woman a credit card who does not know how to use it does not mean that I will sell
it to her. I remember that I was questioned by a senior manager constantly. He would say: ‘Why did you
not cross-sell it?’ and I would answer ‘because it would not be right’ and he replied ‘why do you bother?’
There is a lot of back and forth shouting in the branch because of things like that. (Amanda; Mortgage
Advisor, Bank A, employed since 1986)
9 ‘SELLING PRODUCTS IS THE PRIORITY’: THE DOMINANCE OF
INSTRUMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE BRANCH
BWs who joined the occupation in the early 2000s understood their work and its so-
cial relations primarily in individualist, instrumental and competitive terms this
group’s exclusive exposure to the contemporary PMS and the individualised risks
and rewards it promoted translated into instrumental engagements with customers
that are based on means-end calculations to satisfy performance targets and forestall
disciplinary actions. For example, Bob recollects an incident in a branch where a cus-
tomer who has lost her partner asked for ﬁnancial and legal advice but was not given
a time slot by him and his colleagues. Even though it was an extreme case, this testi-
monial is indicative of the way this group’s engagement with customers became pri-
marily driven by short-term economic principles.
A customer lost their partner and they wanted to be advised how to get access to their savings. What she
wanted was legal advice. This person was still mourning and suffering under the loss. To be honest, I did
not offer her a timeslot, and neither did my younger colleague. It was obvious that we would not be able
to sell her anything. We would have to go with her through all the documents and that takes a lot of
time. The pressure to meet targets is so high that we can’t have a customer in the ofﬁce for 30 minutes
and make no sale. (Bob, Clerk, Bank B, employed since 1996)
This testimonial could be interpreted as an example of employees’ internalisation of
prevalent economic rationality values (Casey, 1995). However, narratives of this
group indicate that their reﬂections and evaluations are not entirely devoid of moral
values of fairness and fellow feeling (Sayer, 2005). Indeed, several accounts of this
group convey moral values of fairness that are inherent in descriptions that regard
the prioritisation of meeting sales targets over the need of customers as not ‘right’.
Yet these evaluations did not inform concrete practices, as they are overshadowed
by the materialist pressures of the target-driven and disciplinary-driven labour pro-
cesses. The following two narratives illustrate how economic calculations take prece-
dence and are used as a justiﬁcation for objectifying customers. An essential point to
note here is that a mutual exclusiveness between bank workers responsibility for the
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faring of others outside the workplace on the one hand and notions of fairness and
justice towards customers as economic and social actors on the other is experienced
to be in conﬂict. Hence, what becomes visible is that this sample of bank workers
complies to the objectiﬁcation and instrumentalisation pressures the workplace re-
gime poses. However, the justiﬁcations that are used in the narratives to explain their
compliance indicate also that they evaluated the instrumentalisation of customers as
violating common norms of fairness and justice.
My role is to sell ﬁnancial products and this is what I am doing. I do not always agree with how cus-
tomers are treated, but the ones who reach their targets get so much extra (…) I struggle ﬁnancially,
so that coming home with an iPod or Xbox means something for my children. (Linda, Customer Advi-
sor, Bank C, employed since 2000)
If I don’t meet my targets I don’t get a bonus and I will be labelled as an underperformer and I might
lose my job. So I am accepting that meeting targets is the priority and that the customer comes second.
(…) It is not right, but we are barely paid above minimum wage and I need the four, ﬁve hundred
pounds extra that the bonus brings once a year to buy my children an extra pair of shoes, or have better
food on the table. (Elliot, Premium Customer Advisor, Bank A, employed since 1998)
Even though this group complied to the pressure to instrumentalise and objectify
customers, a hum of disconnection and disengagement is present in the narratives.
This is particularly inherent in critical evaluations of interviewees which imply that
they felt being treated ‘like a number’ and a ‘cog in the wheel’. These descriptions en-
tail the judgement of the workplace regime and the market discipline it creates as not
conducive to their personal well-being. While these evaluations did not inform visible
oppositional practices, they showcase that workers’ values and norms concerning
decent and fair practices and relations at work were not colonised by the draconian
workplace regime, even though they temporarily complied to it. As John and Sandy
aptly note,
The whole idea of: ‘Here are your targets, sell these products to the customer and then you get a bonus’
is missing the human side. That is why I don’t really engage with it. When I am there I do my stuff and
go home. Perhaps I will leave. It depends if there is an opportunity and if it is close to where I am living.
(John, Bank Teller, Bank D, employed since 2007)
I am here for 6 years now and have work experience in other retail jobs. Even though I would earn less
elsewhere, I consider leaving the bank. It is just too cynical and I feel treated like an object with all these
rules and disciplines in place. I ﬁnd myself being awake at night, telling myself: This is not worth it.
(Sandy, Junior Customer Advisor, Bank B, employed since 2006)
10 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article adopted an ME framework to examine differences in the social relations
between bank workers and customers against the backdrop of a changing workplace
regime. This article contributes to literature that focusses on the interplay between
FLWs moral values and materialist pressures arising from a sales target-driven labour
process and how this dynamic impacts on FLWs social relationships with customers
(Bolton and Houlihan, 2005; Darr, 2011; Korczynski, 2009). A common theme
within this literature is that FLWs’moral values of fair and legitimate economic prac-
tices ‘stand on equal grounds with market logic’ (Darr, 2011: 519). Utilising an ME
perspective, this article adds nuance to this position, illustrating the complex and
often conﬂict-ridden relationship between capitalist practices and people’s morality.
This is visible in the way the prevalent focus on proﬁtability over peoples’ needs shape
but also are reshaped by webs of norms and values of humanity, affecting and being
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affected by human evaluations and people’s moral sentiments (Sayer, 2000; Thomp-
son, 1991). Part and parcel of this dynamic is the concept of lay morality that focusses
on actors’ ongoing monitoring and evaluation of their own and others’ actions and
faring against the backdrop of wider perceptions of justice, fairness and well-being
(Sayer, 2005, 2011). Lay morality puts the spotlight on workers as reﬂective beings
who are capable to evaluate organisational demands and practices critically and
may formally and informally resist or mediate organisational expectations and de-
mands when they experience them to be in conﬂict with their lay morality. Yet the
shape and form of peoples’ lay morality at work might differ between different groups
of workers, contexts and social relations, shaped by the structures and relationships
they have been embedded in over time (Sayer, 2011). In this way, the article reveals
that moral values of fair and legitimate economic practices are based on a slippery
ground that needs to be actively defended and reclaimed by workers given the
contested terrain and power asymmetries that are integral to modern workplaces.
Narratives in this article exemplify that bank workers, even though to different
degrees, did not face the tightly controlled labour process as demoralised subjects
who have no sense of justice or injustice (Casey, 1995). In this way, positions in crit-
ical employment and management studies that reduce morality to prevalent norms
and discourses are refuted, and actor’s capacity to develop throughout their life
course complex needs and commitments to practices and people is highlighted
(Sayer, 2011). Indeed, the article suggests that bank workers continue to draw on their
lay morality they developed under early forms of performance management which
subordinated labour as well and fostered inequality (Knights and McCabe, 1999)
but did not tightly control and instrumentalise relationships with customers. Hence,
it is argued that bank workers lay morality accustoms experienced bank workers to
interpret and evaluate the changes and demands of the new regime intelligibly
(Thompson, 1991), juxtaposing their lay morality with the materialist pressures of
the contemporary PMS workplace regime, engaging in oppositional practices that
mediate and resist an objectiﬁcation and instrumentalisation of customers.
In turn, this article discusses that bank workers were not equally accustomed to
critically evaluate, co-mingle or resist the normative and materialist pressure of the
contemporary sales-driven PMS workplace regime. The article argues that the exclu-
sive exposure of interviewees to the contemporary PMS regime constrained the
development of strong relational moral dispositions of fairness and justice towards
customers. Consequently, this groups’ practices and their relationships to customers
are shaped by materialist values, resulting in the prevalence of instrumentalised rela-
tionships to customers. Thereby, the article offers further detail to the moral di-
lemmas and social struggles of service workers that have been discussed in critical
service work research that has portrayed service workers as being caught between
the expectations from customers and management and experienced their work as
tension ridden (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Korczynski, 2009). Furthermore,
this article seconds the thesis that individualised, closely monitored and disciplin-
ary-driven labour processes seriously constrain opportunities for employees to de-
velop relational moral values and dispositions within the organisation (Fevre, 2003;
Sennett, 1998).
However, this article also suggests that all-encompassing PMS does not fully
determine bank workers experience in general and moral values in particular. Indeed,
the article indicates that the less experienced group of BWs did not commit to the
sales-driven and disciplinary-driven PMS and the economic rationality values and
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instrumental relations they push for, as has been frequently argued in the literature
(Bone, 2006; Casey, 1995). Instead, BWs of this group voiced concerns about how
the workplace regime treats and instrumentalises them (Sayer, 2005). It is articulated
that this groups’ compliance is of temporary nature and may entail seeds of future
resistance.
In conclusion, the ME approach the article utilises points towards a formulation of
a normative critique of marketised employment practices by arguing that the current
performance management workplace regime prioritises market needs over human
needs and strips many of the moral and social texture out of the relationship between
BWs and customers (Bolton and Houlihan, 2005; Korczynski and Ott, 2005). In this
way, an ample warning is offered regarding the social and moral consequences of un-
fettered sales and disciplinary-driven FLSW.
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